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l. J 
I. THEORY AND FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS 
While this section is concerned with the institutions pertaining 
to the Colorado River specifically, the approach to them is tangential 
so as to allow the extant institutions to be embedded in the underlying 
set of alternative policies and institutions, and thus provide a deeper 
appreciation of the status quo. This serves to indicate the appropriate-
ness (or lack thereof) of present institutions in some cases or at least 
their arbitrariness. As matters of equity are difficult and often im-
possible to assess, we observe only the legal and technical efficiency 
of the institutions and water laws. 
A. Water as a Resource 
Water is most appropriately considered a stochastically renewable 
natural resource. For most purposes water may be typified either as 
surface water or ground water* although other types such as diffused 
surface water and springs are recognized. Ground water can generally 
be considered as either underground streams or percolating water. For 
legal purposes the former is usually treated as surface water. Various 
activities differ in their consumptive use of water; some, such as re-
creation, wildlife refuge and preservation, power generation, maintenance 
of fish stocks and scenic values, consume minimal or no water at all, and 
may possess public or environmental as well as private characteristics . 
*Some ground water sources are nonrenewable or recharging at such a slow 
rate as to be so considered. Thus, strictly speaking, water supply may 
consist of both renewable and nonrenewabl.e components. 
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As water, like air, was historically considered a free (or at least 
relatively abundant) good, it is not surprising that until recently 
many of the environmental aspects of water use and allocation were 
largely neglected (see [l]). 
The dominant use of water has been as consumptive private use 
primarily in irrigation, industry, and municipal water supplies. Con-
sequently the definition and implementation of water rights is central 
to the degree of efficiency obtained in the allocation of water usage. 
Fundamental problems in the delineation of water rights arise from both 
the variability of flows and uncertainty concerning the basic nature of 
flows. The variability of flows provides no conceptual problem although 
it is an impediment to straightforward policy. However, the flow uncer-
tainty is problematic as water laws have had a tendency to precede the 
availability of accurate hydrologic data. 
B. Property Rights 
Water rights are generally considered to be real property, but 
this distinction is tenuous and differs with alternative water rights 
doctrines. Riparian water rights are based on the right of a landowner 
whose property is bordered by water to use that water on his land. How-
ever, the right is usufructuary so that in the strict sense the owner 
may not diminish the supply of water. This doctrine is interpreted so 
that riparians may make withdrawals that are "reasonable" in r elation 
to the needs of downstream riparians. The doctrine of reasonable use 
is usually adjudicated in the courts, and interpretation may be later 
revised. This adds an element of uncertainty which stands as an impedi-
ment to efficient development of water rightH. 
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In the western United States and the Colorado River Basin parti-
cularly, the doctrine of appropriation has governed water law. This 
doctrine is a western American innovation which emerged due to the 
unsuitability of the riparian system in arid lands. Rights are obtained 
by physically diverting water and putting it to beneficial consumptive 
use. While beneficial consumptive use is not clearly defined, the logic 
underlying the concept and its importance to the appropriation doctrine 
is compelling: development of the arid western states requires scarce 
water to be physically consumed, indicating the inappropriateness of 
the riparian system. Under the appropriation doctrine priorities are 
determined by the chronological pattern in which uses are developed: 
"first in time means first in right". However in times of extreme 
drought priorities are generally established in the order: (i) municipal 
and domestic; (ii) irrigation; (iii) coDll!lercial and industrial; even in 
this event compensation may be required for senior appropriators whose 
rights are temporarily usurped. 
Ground water is a significant source of water supply, estimated 
to be more than eight times the annual supply of all rivers and fresh 
water lakes in the nation. Ground water law has emerged recently as 
surface supplies became more completely utilized, with doctrines chang-
ing as more became known about the migration, source and rate of re-
charge of underground aquifers. Recognition of the common property 
characteristic of percolating ground water led to the adoption of the 
doctrine of correlative rights by many states. This doctrine limits 
landowners' rights in the common pool to the proportion of his land to 
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all land overlying the pool. In many states ground water may be appro-
priated in much the same manner as surface water . However, several 
problems remain in the administration of ground water supplies: the 
extent of the right to have artesian pressure maintained; the extent 
to which ground water supplies should be mined or depleted; the extent 
to which ground water and surface water supplies should be integrated 
for more efficient administration and utilization. 
There is an historical basis for the development of water rights 
institutions to their present form. The riparian doctrine, character-
izing primarily eastern United States rivers, emanated from the English 
system of law, and was limited by the greater navigability of those 
rivers. The appropriation doctrine eminent in the later developed 
western rivers, and the Colorado River in particular, emerged at a time 
and in a place where water was essential to production and relatively 
limited in supply. In particular, as western development accelerated, 
the constraints imposed by the highly variable low-runoff of the Col orado 
River became apparent. While the possibility of water shortages is dis-
concerting, they need not be problematic with appropriate water adminis-
tration . Dams can be built so as to reduce the effective variability 
of surface run-off, but implicit and sometimes explicit limitations on 
transfers have the potential to preclude the efficient allocation of 
water. However, it is likely that these restrictions will be relaxed 
when scarcity grows and alternative sources become more expensive . The 
nature of water laws and restrictions on transfer of water rights for 
each of the basin states is swmnarized in a later section. 
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C. Efficiency of Water Rights Allocations 
An increase in the number and types of societal demand for water 
indicates that clashes with vested water rights and assigned priorities 
are forthcoming. Weatherford and Jacoby [2] assert that in many of the 
basin states this will occur in the next fifteen to twenty years, while 
for a few it is already present. 
Limitations on the transferability of water rights exist in the 
form of federal, interregional, interstate, and intrastate restrictions. 
Federal controls stem primarily from concerns over the repayment of con-
struction and operation and maintenance costs of storage and diversion 
facilities. Interregional restrictions are embodied in the Colorado 
River Compact of 1922, while interstate restrictions exist in the 1948 
Compact (Upper Basin) and the 1973 Supreme Court decision, Arizona vs. 
California (Lower Basin). Intrastate restrictions stem from the his-
torical notion that water rights should be tied to the land and, to 
some extent, the purpose to which the original right was assigned. 
While the original and subsequent apportionment of water rights 
raises questions of equity, regardless of their assignment, limitations 
on the transfer of water rights constitute a substantive impediment to 
achieving an efficient final allocation of water rights. Transfer of 
water rights would generate a more efficient allocation and relieve 
misallocative pressures where they are the greatest. Reliance on the 
transfer of water rights is not a panacea, but it i s a step in the 
right direction. The publicness of water suggests that government 
intervention may be necessary to ensure the provision and preservation 
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of these aspects of water resources. Likewise the possibility of a 
rights transfer resulting in third-party damage is not unlikely. In 
these cases the courts should adjudicate the damages and tie them to 
the transfer. Also the increasing importance of water quality, as well 
as quantity, attached to rights must be considered. Regardless, this 
would call for specific regulation rather than the general obstruction 
of water right transfers. 
Frequently transfer of water rights has been espoused as the key 
to efficient allocations of water rights (e.g., see [5]). While trans-
fer of rights to more productive uses leads to increased efficiency, it 
will not generally lead to an optimal allocation under the appropriation 
doctrine. The appropriation doctrine leaves to each subsequent appro-
priator a river which is relatively less desirable. 
In contrast the 
doctrine of correlative rights would lead to a more efficient pattern 
of river use, as risk would be shared equally among all rights owners. 
While the appropriation system becomes equivalent to correlative rights 
when a market for contingent commodities is introduced, obstructions 
such as fixed diversion capacities, transaction costs, and legal impedi-
ments would tend to preclude such an occurrence. However, a modified 
version of such a market might lead to a second-best solution . 
D. Administration of Water Rights 
To further highlight the implications of central administration of 
water versus reliance on private market s, we indicate the potential 
functions that such a central authority would attempt to satisfy. They 
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are: (i) distributive, in that the authority would attempt to generate 
an "equitable" distribution of rights; (ii) allocative, in that an effi-
cient economic allocation of rights is desired; (iii) regulatory, in 
that the authority needs to closely monitor the consumption and dis-
charges of users, and gauge the behavior of the hydrosystem. 
There is no reason to suspect that centrally administered rights 
would be more equitable than a market determined allocation. Likewise 
there are strong efficiency argwnents in favor of competitive markets. 
Consequently, the central management of water supplies should be limited 
primarily to a regulatory f unction . As the Colorado River is almost 
completely allocated in the Upper Basin and will be overallocated in 
the Lower Basin with the commencement of Central Arizona Project diver-
sions, the need for closely monitoring consumption, gauging river flow, and 
maintaining quality checks is obvious. Moreover certain public aspects 
of water need central protection and externalities need proper control. 
In particular the nonimpairment of rights by others must be guaranteed 
or compensated for in the event of impairment. While the central 
authority, in the form of the relevant State Engineers office or the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, currently executes some of these 
functions, more comprehensive effort will become necessary. 
Developments in water law have resulted in an increased awareness 
of the public interest and a tendency towards greater central involve-
ment. Some of the issues that must be faced are the trade-offs implicit 
in the construction and regulation of storage facilities. In particular 
one must align the social benefits of flood control and reduced varia-
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bility in flow with the social costs of high evaporation losses. Other 
pressing problems are the definition of shortages and the implementation 
of specific policies for remedying them, the need for integration between 
ground and surface water management, the appropriate pricing of water, 
inter- and intrastate transfers, and downstream water losses. 
E. Energy Development 
The existence of vast coal and oil shale deposits in the Upper 
Basin and the need for water in processing, primarily for the removal of 
wastes, and for cooling purposes, poses a threat of conflict between 
various prospective demands for water as these energy sources are devel-
oped. An analogous situation exists in the Lower Basin, where rights 
are completely allocated, and there is potential need for additonal water 
for cooling purposes at nuc lear power plants whose construc tion may be 
considered in the near future . The development of other industries and 
the growth of other water needs is not insignificant, but the needs of 
potential energy producers are unique in that their water requirements 
are ephemeral, either due to the exhaustibility of the r esource or the 
possible future substitution of a water-extensive process such as the 
direct conversion of solar to electrical energy . 
The matter of water rights, interpretations and transferability, 
is of paramount importance in the ultimate resolution of these issues. 
For example, some physical solutions have already been suggested . Jensen 
{3] shows that lowering Lake Mead reservoir levels will reduce evapora-
tion losses to the extent that the water savings will enable such auxil-
iary power sources to generate electricity far in excess of losses in 
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hydropower resulting from lower lake levels. However, in view of the 
implied inability to meet agricultural water requirements in the event 
of successive periods of low runoff, it is difficult to imagine how such 
a solution might be generated under the existing system of water rights. 
F. Summary 
Water rights on the Colorado River are primarily appropriative. 
Any system of property rights is by nature arbitrary and subject to 
question on the grounds of distributional equity. Questions of equity 
are basically insoluble. However, water rights are encumbered by insti-
tutional appendages to the extent that the allocation of existing and 
potential water rights is or will be substantially distorted. Greater 
reliance on private markets to effect allocations with administrative 
involvement only to rectify externalities, insure public good properties, 
monitoring the river system, and policing the behavior of consumers 
would simplify management and improve the pattern of water usage. 
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II. SUMMARY OF WATER LAW 
This section presents a brief exposition of legal doctrines 
applicable to the Colorado River Basin and separate swmnaries of the 
basin state laws. For a thorough discussion of the development of state 
water laws see [6]. 
A General Summary: Surface Water 
Rights to use water can be obtained in a number of ways and once 
obtained can be acquired by a potential buyer through the purchase of 
an existing right. Substantial amounts of water are supplied by Bureau 
of Reclamation or Corps of Engineer projects. Corps projects usually 
contract storage space to water users, who have obtained rights under 
state law, and then impound water and make it available for delivery 
to those individuals. Bureau of Reclamation projects usually acquire 
the water right directly from the state and then wholesale such water 
to water districts which in turn retail the water to users with whom 
they have contracts. This is done at a cost which purports to amortize 
reimbursable construction costs and costs of operation and maintenance . 
Irrigation water usually is subsidized, whereas municipal and industrial 
water repay their full prorated share of the cost. Hydroelectric power 
sales amortize project costs not accounted for by the sale of water 
through delivery contracts. 
Initially appropriative rights were obtained by merely diverting 
water and putting it to beneficial use. Moreover, the intended extent 
of use was relevant, even if the entire use was not achieved until after 
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a long period of time, and once accomplished the right related back to 
the date of original appropriation. This relating back doctrine is now 
limited to a shorter period, during which diversionary structures must 
be constructed and beneficial use accomplished. Applications must 
usually be filed with the State Engineer, and nonimpairment of senior 
rights and the public interest must be established. An approved appli-
cation constitutes an inchoate right which is perfected upon demonstra-
tion of beneficial use. Applications may be lapsed if lack of diligence 
in completing the project is determined. Lapsed applications may be 
reinstated, but the priority is determined by the reinstatement date 
and not that of the original application. 
When applications are filed, the appropriator must describe the 
specific watercourse and the ultimate right is limited by that descrip-
tion. For example, an overappropriated stream may be augmented, say, 
by the discharge into the watercourse of effluent ground water pumped 
for municipal purposes, and a new applicant may apply to appropriate 
this water over the protests of senior appropriators, as this source 
of water was not contemplated by the senior rights holders when they 
acquired their rights. On the other hand, a right to appropriate from 
a designated tributary could not, in the event of insufficient tributary 
flow, be supplemented by diversions from the main stem. 
Distinctions are also made between beneficial kinds of use and 
beneficial methods of use. Beneficial kinds of use are usually irri-
gation, mining, manufacturing, municipal, domestic and other economic 
related purposes. However, water must be used efficiently as well. 
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Inefficient water use is illegal. The appropriative right limits use 
to efficient use, and appropriators can be required to alter their 
practices so as to achieve this goal. Rights to salvaged water may or 
may not be obtained depending upon whether the salvaged water was pre-
viously wasted or resulted from improved efficiency in a use that was 
not previously wasteful in the legal sense. 
Appropriative rights may generally be sold and transferred either 
with or separate from the land on which the water is used. If the water 
is to be used in the same manner and place as previously, matters are 
fairly simple. However, if there is to be a change in use, an applica-
tion must be filed and then reviewed and acted upon by the state water 
rights administrator. Perhaps the most common problem encountered is 
that of return streamflow. For example, a significant portion of water 
diverted for irrigation returns to the watercourse. If the return flow 
is altered by the new use, the change may not be approved or the right 
may be reduced to account for the alteration . In fact even the pattern 
of return flow is important. In irrigation return flow often takes 
several weeks; if the pattern of use is altered so as to affect the 
availability of water to downstream divertors, the upstream change in 
use may not be permitted. 
Another problem is that some entities holding water rights, such 
as irrigation districts, may be prohibited from selling or transferring 
any part of their water rights. These restrictions were originally 
intended to protect the users in the district against sales of water 
rights which might excessively diminish the supply available to them. 
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However, as the directors of irrigation districts are members of the 
district, these restrictions actually work against the district's in-
terest by preventing the transfer of water to more lucrative uses. 
Appropriative rights are dependent on continued beneficial use of 
the water. Rights may be lost by abandonment when it is clearly the 
intent of the right holder to permanently discontinue his use of water. 
Loss of rights through forfeiture may occur when nonuse occurs, usually 
for a period of five years, but in some cases as few as two years. 
Rights may also be lost through prescription or adverse use. Usually 
this occurs when an upstream user diverts more water than he is entitled 
to divert and thus adverses a downstream user. If this continues for 
the statutory period, the right may accrue to the upstream user with 
the priority date of the right adversed. Many problems arose from the 
doctrine of adverse use, since, although the courts viewed water rights 
as akin to real property rights, the number of upstream users and their 
spatial separation from downstream users often made it difficult for a 
downstream user to know that he was being adversed. Consequently this 
doctrine is fairly uniformly rejected. 
Lastly, rights may be lost by estoppel. If a right holder, for 
example, assists another in surveying, constructing, etc., for the 
purpose of diverting water for use, the former may be estopped from 
later claiming unreasonable use by the latter, as by his own actions 
he implicitly condoned the use. 
B. General Summary: Ground Water 
Ground water law developed on the erroneous assumption that ground 
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water was physically distinct and separable from surface water. In fact 
ground water augments surface water in the humid east, while the reverse 
is generally true in the arid west. Also, most ground water is percolat-
ing and does not flow in definite underground streams as was previously 
thought. 
Before the hydrology of ground water was understood, the owner of 
overlying land was considered to have absolute right to use or was te 
water as he saw fit. Soon afterwards absolute ownership was modified 
by the doctrine of reasonable use. A refinement of reasonable use appears 
in the doctrine of correlative rights. This doctrine asserts that the 
owner of land overlying a ground water basin has rights t o water in the 
amount determined by the percentage of his land to all such overlying 
land. In practice this doctrine is seldom applied rigidly as many over-
lying land owners may not be using water. 
Some western states declare all waters to be public and hence 
subject to appropriation; the procedure is essentially the same for both 
surface and ground water. However some problems exist with r espect to 
ground water as hydrologic facts are often more difficult to ascertain 
so that uncertainties and the possibility of impairment of existing 
rights are greater. A number of other problems exist as mentioned 
earlier such as the right to have artesian pressure and water levels 
maintained, the mining of ground water (extraction in excess of r echarge), 
etc., but perhaps the most pressing is the need for integration of ground 
water and surface water management. 
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C Policies of Individual States 
Arizona. Applications to appropriate surface waters are filed 
with the State land department and the right is perfected upon imple-
mentation of beneficial consumptive use. Competing applications for the 
same water supply are given the following preference: (i) domestic and 
municipal; (ii) irrigation and stock watering; (iii) power and mining; 
(iv) recreation and wildlife. Priority of the right is absolute and 
determined by the date of perfection. Rights cannot be enlarged, even 
by increased efficiency in use. Rights are viewed as an appurtenance 
to the land, but may be severed or transferred to other uses upon 
approval of the State land department provided other rights are not 
impaired. Such a transfer or change in use carries no loss in priority. 
Rights may be lost by forfeiture, abandonment, adverse use or estoppel. 
Percolating ground water is treated differently and considered to 
be the property of the owner of the land. However, there is some modi-
fication in that the right is limited to reasonable use. Also, use may 
be restricted in critical ground water areas where supplies have been 
depleted too rapidly. 
California. California recognizes both riparian and appropriation 
water rights doctrines. When claims conflict, appropriateive rights are 
held superior if they were perfected prior to the riparian right. Other-
wise the riparian right prevails. Essentially these rights can be con-
sidered appropriative with priority determined by the date of right 
perfection.* 
*There are some execptions. See [] p. 135 and f 3.4. 
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Applications for appropriative rights must be filed with the State 
Water Rights Board, then circulated to specified parties. If protested, 
the Board conducts a hearing concerning the application, the decision 
being subject to judicial review if desired by the applicant. Approved 
applications are accompanied by permits establishing priority dates and 
giving the State's consent to appropriate water. However, the right is 
obtained only after the water is beneficially employed. 
Riparian rights may be obtained only by purchasers of riparian land. 
Such lands are those contiguous to streams and acquired by grant from 
the United States, Mexico or the State of California. Once the title to 
land is obtained, the riparian right is established, regardless of use 
or nonuse. However, the right may be lost by prescription, transfer, 
condemnation, or estoppel. Both riparian and appropriation rights may 
be obtained to salvaged water. Riparian rights are limited to reasonable 
use vis-a-vis the uses of other riparians. Orders of priority are domes-
tic, irrigation, and industrial . 
The appropriative right is determined by beneficial use, which 
may not exceed the quantity stated on the permit. Priorities are de-
termined by chronological perfection of the right and also according to 
the same use pattern as the riparian right. Appropriative rights may 
be transferred by changes of place of use, nature of use, point of 
diversion, and diversion works provided the rights of others are not 
impaired . Riparian rights are appurtenant to the land but may be severed 
if there is no injury to other riparians and they consent to the trans-
fer. However, irrigation districts are prohibited from selling water 
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rights or leasing for a contract period exceeding three years . Transfer 
of rights results in no priority loss except that due to altered use. 
Ground water in California is either (i) water underflowing a water 
course; (ii) definite underground streams; (iii) percolating waters. The 
first two are treated as surface water, while the third is subject to the 
doctrine of correlative right. Underground waters are assumed to be of 
the third type unless determined otherwise. The correlative right is 
very similar to the riparian right except the right of the overlying 
owner is always an appurtenance to the land . The correlative right is 
limited only by the reasonable needs of other overlying owners. It is 
a private right so that a city can mine underlying water only after ob-
taining legal title to the overlying land. Due to the possibility of 
salt water intrusion, withdrawals in excess of natural recharge are pro-
hibited. 
Nevada. After considerable vacillation Nevada has adopted the 
doctrine of appropriative rights. Applications for rights are filed 
with the State engineer who then determines the ultimate form of the 
right. In the event of conflicting interests he resolves the issue and 
forwards his recommendation to the appropriate district court where the 
issue is adjudicated. The right is perfected subsequent to proof of 
beneficial consumptive use . 
All water, whether surface or ground, belongs to the public. Water 
may be appropriated for any recognized beneficial use: irrigation, power, 
municipal, mining, stock- watering and recreation. Chronological prior-
ity is limited by beneficial use; appropriations cannot legally exceed 
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beneficial use. Appropriations may be restricted to certain portions of 
the year. Moreover a senior downstream appropriator may have to forfeit 
water to a junior upstream appropriator if the water reaching the former 
is insufficient in quantity to be used beneficially. Transfer or changes 
in place or purpose of use or point of diversion may be approved provided 
there is no impairment of other rights, including those of junior appro-
priators. Rights may be lost only by forfeiture or abandonment. Rights 
may be acquired to saved or developed waters. While ground and surface 
water are treated the same, use of ground water may be restricted if the 
State engineer determines that a ground water basin is being depleted. 
Colorado. Colorado has always been an appropriation state, and by 
completely abrogating the riparian doctrine, the pure appropriation 
doctrine was first known as the Colorado doctrine, as opposed to the 
California doctrine which attempted to recognize both appropriation and 
riparianism. Water administration comes under the State engineer, dis-
trict engineers, and court-appointed district ~ater judges. Rights to 
divert and put unappropriated water to beneficial use are undeniable, 
and are initiated by actual diverting water and putting it to beneficial 
use . Recognized beneficial uses are domestic, agricultural, industrial, 
municipal and recreational. Priorities of a right are adjudicated by 
the water judge, and priority dates may differ from dates of appropria-
tion initiation. Priorities may also be obtained for conditional water 
rights (i.e., those attached to projects requiring a lengthy construction 
period); upon completion the date relates back to the initial physical 
demonstration of intention to appropriate. 
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Ownership of unappropriated water is public subject to appropria-
tion. The right is transferable either as an appurtenance to the land 
or severed from it. However, a change of water right (change of type, 
place, time of use, point of diversion, or storage) must be approved 
by the water judge conditional to nonimpairment of vested rights and 
subject to possible limitations necessary to protect such rights. Rights 
may be lost only by abandonment and in a limited degree by adverse use. 
Ground water is either tributary ground water or nontributary 
ground water. Unless otherwise determined, ground water is assumed to 
be of the former type and hence subject to appropriation. The latter 
type is subject to a modified version of the appropriation doctrine, 
limited sometimes due to the coDllllon property characteristic and the 
overdraft problem, but generally can be considered subject to the law 
of appropriation. 
New Mexico. The law of prior appropriation had been established 
in New Mexico before it became a territory in 1850. Unappropriated wa-
ter belongs to the public and is subject to appropriation. Generally 
an application is submitted to the State engineer , and if a right is 
granted its priority relates back to that on the application; to be 
approved an application must be in the public interest. The State engi-
neer may reduce the amount of the request or alter the period of annual 
use of water. An approved application specifies a time by which the water 
must be put to beneficial use. Rights are perfected for the amount ulti-
mately used beneficially not exceeding the requested amount. Beneficial 
use is not specified by either court ruling or statute.* 
*Potential vacationers should be aware that in New Mexico travelers may 
not be refused water. 
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Rights may be changed or transferred without loss of priority; 
however, any such action must carry the approval of the State engineer 
indicating the nonimpairment of other rights. Rights may be lost by 
forfeiture, abandonment, while adverse use and estoppel have only minor 
importance. All ground waters are public and subject to appropriation. 
In a recent decision the courts upheld the State engineer's decision to 
limit use of a nonrechargeable aquifier to a rate which would leave one 
third in storage after 40 years. It is incumbent on appropriator of 
ground water to exhibit nonimpairment of existing rights. 
Utah. Utah has explicitly adopted the appropriation doctrine and 
repudiated the riparian system. All water above or below ground is con-
sidered to be public and subject to appropriation for beneficial use. 
The State engineer is delegated chief administrative responsibility in 
water matters, but ultimate decisions are adjudicated in district court. 
Applications to appropriate are filed with the State engineer . After 
posting general notice of the application and determining nonimpairment 
of other rights and confirming the physical and economic viability of 
the plan, the State engineer may approve the application which is then 
considered an inchoate right. Perfection of the right occurs when the 
water is diverted and put to beneficial use. After this the right may 
be adjudicated for final determination. 
Priority is determined by the application date. There is no spe-
cific preference among competing uses and such conflicts are resolved on 
an ad hoc basis. However, in time of shortage there is a preference for 
domestic over agricultural over all other uses. Changes or transfers of 
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right must be approved by the State engineer subject to the nonimpaitment 
of existing rights both junior and senior. In addition users are allowed 
to exchange water by storing water in one place and diverting a like 
amount (less evaporative and seepage losses) at another. Rights may be 
lost by forfeiture, abandonment, or estoppel, but not by prescription. 
Salvaged or developed water accrues to the developer. Ground water is 
subject to the same procedure and rights as surface water; reductions in 
well pressure are allowed, although limited, vis-a-vis the connnon property 
characteristic. 
Wyoming. All water in Wyoming is State property and subject to 
appropriation except when such use would be contrary to the public in-
teres t. Due to the aridity of the State the riparian doctrine was re-
pudiated, as the appropriation doctrine was better adapted to the area. 
Applications to appropriate are filed with the State engineer who may 
approve the request subject to the nonimpairment of other rights. Per-
fection of rights requires proof of beneficial use. Preferred uses are 
recognized but not listed exhaustively; preferred uses include domest i c , 
municipal, steam, power plants, and industrial. Changes and transfers 
are not allowed except when such a transaction leads to a more preferred 
use of water. However, there are some exceptions to this rule and the 
unconstitutionality of the restriction has been determined in some cases. 
Water rights may be lost through forfeiture or abandonment and to a 
limited degree through prescription or estoppel. Ground water is treated 
essentially the same as surface water, although applications may be de-
nied in critical areas. 
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III. LEGISLATION, LITIGATION AND RIGHTS ALLOCATION 
This section summarizes the content and import of the primary legal 
institutions concerning the Colorado River and relates their implications 
for rights allocations or, in some cases, their ambiguity in such matters. 
Reclamation Act (1902). The impetus for development of the Colorado 
River was provided initially by the Reclamation Act of 1902. This act 
created the Reclamation Service and encouraged "family farm" development 
of irrigable areas of the Colorado River. Since it limited individual 
water rights to irrigate a maximum of 160 acres, efficient development 
of irrigated lands was later inhibited. 
The Reclamation Act strengthened demands for a storage facility, 
most likely in either Black or Boulder Canyon, and an All-American Canal 
for the Imperial Valley in Southern California. Until that time irri-
gation water had been routed through Mexico via the Alamo Canal. The 
more slowly developing Upper Basin states opposed Lower Basin storage 
as they feared the more developed Lower Basin states would appropriate 
excessive water rights and consequently inhibit future Upper Basin de-
velopment. The desire for development in the Lower Basin and the fear 
of loss of water rights in the Upper Basin led to the ultimate division 
of the waters in the Colorado Compact of 1922. 
Colorado Compact (1922). The desire for storage by Lower Basin 
states was compounded by the danger of floods and problems of dual sov-
ereignty arising from the Alamo channel. The Upper Basin fears had 
solid foundation in light of the Supreme Court's 1922 endorsement of 
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"prior appropriation" as the governing principle in equitable apportion-
ment litigation. Consequently the Colorado River Commission was appointed 
and in the brief space of two weeks generated the Colorado River Compact . 
Ratification by the required six of seven states did not occur until 1928 
with Arizona withholding until 1944. The Compact was approved by Congress 
as part of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928). 
The Compact is plagued with a lack of clarity at places, represent-
ing a lack of foresight or just the realization that attempts to clearly 
delineate all provisions may have precluded mutual agreement. The cost, 
of course, is that controversies must be settled by litigation, a time-
consuming and expensive process that may overlook efficient settlements.* 
The Compact designates Lee Ferry as the dividing point between the 
two basins. It recognizes the likelihood of a treaty with Mexico and 
requires that the treaty obligations be discharged equally by both basins . 
It assigns 7.5 MAF of water yearly to the Upper and Lower Basins. While 
the Lower Basin was allowed to increase its rights by another 1 MAF, this 
provision is relatively unimportant as the runoff of the Colorado was sub-
stantially overestimated at the time the Compact was signed . Ultimately 
the dominant provision of the Compact was the Upper Basins' requirement 
to deliver 75 MAF of water at Lee Ferry during every ten year period. 
Thus the Upper Basin shouldered the burden of stream variability and per-
manent or cyclic reductions in mean runoff. Depending on the time period 
selected, the average virgin flow of Lee Ferry varies from 13 to 15 MAP. 
*For an excellent discussion of congressional versus judicial apportion-
ment, see Meyers. 
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Tree ring studies conducted by the Lake Powell Research Project have 
determined that the early 1900's was one of heaviest flow periods in 
the river's history and that the runoff since 1930 is representative 
of the average flow during the last four centuries~about 13.5 MAF per 
year. Thus the Upper Basin's allocation is reduced by 20 percent prior 
to meeting Mexican obligations and evaporation losses. The Lower Basin 
has available for consumption at Lake Mead the delivered 7.5 MAF plus 
inflows minus reservoir evaporation and channel losses between Lee Ferry 
and final points of diversion. Lake Mead evaporation averages 0.8 MAF, 
while net inflows between Lee Ferry and Lake Mead average 0.8 MAF. Thus 
7.5 MAF should be available for consumption at Lake Mead* minus any 
obligations to Mexico. 
It is not clear whether the Lower Basin's option to exercise rights 
over an additional 1 MAF stems from the estimates of average runoff at 
the time (1899 to 1920 flow at Lee Ferry was 16.4 MAF) or from considera-
tion of the Gila River, which in 1923 was discharging an average of 1.1 
MAF yearly into the Colorado . While the Compact asserted that all tri-
butaries of the Colorado were to be considered in the allocation of 
rights, no mention was made of Arizona's consumption as of that time of 
2.3 MAF Gila River water, much of which was annually replaced groundwater. 
However this confusion is most likely irrelevant: (i) it seems unlikely 
that runoff will be high enough during the future to allow any additional 
claims; (ii) in Arizona v. California (1963) the Supreme Court determined 
*See Table 2 inthe Appendix for quantities available on a yearly basis . 
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that Arizona should not be charged for Gila River water consumption as 
pertaining to the 1922 Compact. By 1963 Arizona was almost completely 
consuming the Gila; on the average only about 1000 acre-feet was actually 
discharged into the Colorado and sometimes the contribution was as low 
as 300-400 acre-feet per year. Arizona argued that since the Gila River 
lay entirely within her boundaries and emptied just above the Mexican 
border, no other state could efficiently use the water, and hence Arizona 
should not be charged under the 1922 Compact. Apparently the Supreme 
Court accepted this argument. 
The Compact indicates a preference for agricultural and domestic 
uses of water over use for power generation, and it declares present 
perfected rights of downstream users to be unimpaired in the event that 
Upper Basin storage facilities are later developed. The latter provision, 
conjoined with the former, resulted in conflict between the two basins 
subsequent to construction of Glen Canyon Dam. 
There are a number of problems which arise either as a result or 
in spite of the Compact. First "beneficial consumptive use" depends 
upon the accounting procedure used to measure consumption. The Upper 
Colorado River Compact adopted the "net depletion" of virgin flow method, 
in which use of salvaged water which would have been lost anyway due to 
natural causes (i.e., a flooded meadow) would not be charged to the user. 
The Boulder Canyon Project Act, which allocated water among the Lower 
Basin states, adopted the "diversions less return flows" method, which 
charges users with actual consumption at the site of use. In Arizona v. 
California the Special Master interpreted the Compact as adopting the 
"diversions less return flows" rule. 
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A conflict resulted from the Lower Basin's right to surplus waters 
as opposed to the superiority of domestic and agricultural rights over 
power generation. Roughly, the conflict is resolved to some extent by 
providing for accumulation in Lake Powell for future domestic and agri-
cultural use subject to the condition that the levels of Lake Powell and 
Lake Mead be equalized. Other problems include the provision of Mexican 
requirements, which is discussed below, water quality, which was not 
mentioned in the Compact, and the treatment of ground water. It appears 
that ground water use would be considered as consumption towards the 
appropriative limit in view of the Supreme Court's support of the "diver-
sion less return flows" method of accounting. 
Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928). The Boulder Canyon Project Act 
is the vehicle that transformed the Colorado River Compact into law. 
Additionally it provided for the construction of Boulder Dam, first 
known as Hoover Dam,* in Boulder Canyon, although it was ultimately 
located in Black Canyon, some 20 miles downstream. Also it allocated 
Lower Basin rights between the three states with California receiving 
4.4 MAF, Arizona 2 . 8 MAF, and Nevada 0.3 MAF. In 1963 the Supreme Court 
used this act as the sole basis in resolving the water litigation between 
California and Arizona. However, the act did not address the treatment 
of evaporation losses or the allocation of shortages. 
Arizona v. California. As early as 1921 Arizona had been con-
templating a high line canal to divert Colorado River water to central 
*In 1947 Congress determined that the dam in Black Canyon should be known 
as Hoover Dam. 
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Arizona.* This culminated in the Central Arizona Project, Arizona's 
prime objective since she finally ratified the Boulder Canyon Project 
Act in 1944. Although the Project Act allocated 2.8 MAF of water to 
Arizona, she was unable to use this water in its entirety and feared 
that California might perfect rights by appropriating water that Arizona 
was not consuming at that time. These fears were perhaps not unfounded, 
as California has been consuming Colorado River water in quantities 
close to 1 MAP in excess of her allotted 4.4 MAF. 
From the time the Boulder Canyon Project Act was signed into law 
in 1929, Arizona took California to the Supreme Court five times (1931, 
1934, 1935, 1936, 1963). The first four su1ts were disallowed, but the 
most recent suit (in 1963) was decided on the basis of the allocations 
prescribed in the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The only headway that 
Arizona made resulted from the decision of the Special Master to deter-
mine allocations during times of drought on the basis of 44/75 of appro-
priations to California, 28/75 to Arizona, and 3/75 to Nevada. However 
Arizona's gain was for practical purposes obliterated when Congress gave 
California absolute water rights to 4.4 MAF with priority over the 
Central Arizona Project in the event of a shortage.** 
The Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California, however, pro-
vided a subtle victory for Arizona in another way. In 1951 a House 
Conunittee resolved to postpone consideration of the Central Arizona 
Project until the use of Colorado River water by the Lower Basin states 
*See Hendley, p. 121. 
**See Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 USC § 152l(b) 1971. 
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was either settled by mutual agreement or in the courts. Previously, 
the courts had in general refused to allocate future rights, preferring 
to intercede only when present appropriations were overallocated. Arizona 
appeared to be in a quandary: without water she could not get the canal, 
and without the canal she could not get water. However, the Special 
Master affirmed Arizon's right to 2.8 MAF of Colorado River water, and 
the day after the Supreme Court decision, the Arizona senators presented 
a bill to authorize the Central Arizona Project. 
Certain other issues of importance were resolved in this Supreme 
Court decision. First, the Gila River was excluded for accounting pur-
poses in determining Arizona's yearly consumption. Arizona consumes 
about 2 MAF per year from the Gila River, but the river is entirely 
within Arizona and contributes only negligible amounts to the Colorado 
at its mouth. In the event that the decision had been reversed on this 
issue, California could have increased its consumption by about 1 MAF 
per year. Second, the Secretary of the Interior, on the direction of 
Congress or at his own discretion, was to allocate water among the Lower 
Basin states in the event .of a shortage. Among the methods that he might 
adopt was the basis of existing contracts: 44/75 to California, 28/75 to 
Arizona, and 3/75 to Nevada. In no case, however, was California to be 
allocated more than 4.4 MAF. The third point of particular interest 
was the entitlement of Indian reservations and other federal establish-
ments to use water to the extent of the purpose for which they were 
created, with rights perfected as of the date the unit was established . 
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The Mexican Treaty (1944). The Colorado River Compact, in somewhat 
vague terms, mentioned the possibility of a future treaty with Mexico. 
Presidential authorization to meet with Mexican representatives to study 
the equitable division of the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman occurred in 
1924, but Mexico, sensing that her bargaining position would be improved, 
insisted that the Colorado be included as well. In 1927 the investiga-
tion was broadened to cover the two rivers jointly. Mexico's bargaining 
strength in this scenario came from her need for Colorado River water 
aligned with her control of 70 percent of the Rio Grande's tributary 
inflows. 
In 1944 the Mexican Treaty was signed. There was an equal division 
of the Rio Grande waters below Fort Quitman, to which Mexican tributaries 
contributed 70 percent, while Mexico received nearly 10 percent of the 
average annual runoff of the Colorado River (16 MAF being the figure used 
at the time). Mexico and Texas appeared to have benefited at the Colorado 
Basin states expense. Specifically the treaty provided that Mexico would 
be guaranteed annually 1.5 MAF from the Colorado and that in times of 
surplus up to an additional 200,000 acre-feet, but that no rights could 
be acquired in excess of 1.5 MAF. The possibility of reducing deliveries 
to Mexico was considered but subject to conditions: (1) extraordinary 
drought; (2) difficulty in making the specified deliveries; (3) reduction 
in United States consumptive uses. The existence of immense storage 
capacities in the Colorado River Basin make it unlikely that (3) would 
eccur, and conjoined with the vagueness of (1) and (2), it appears that 
reduction of deliveries to Mexico is extremely unlikely. 
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The delivery schedules specify maximum and minimum rates of deliv-
ery, the limits varying at different times of the year, and provide for 
1 MAF from the main stem and 0.5 MAF from the All-American Canal to be 
delivered annually until 1980 with the respective figures being 1.125 
MAF and 0.375 MAF after 1980. Ultimately this scheme was not followed. 
Currently 1 MAF is delivered through the All-American Canal, primarily 
so as to minimize channel losses, and to some extent so as to leave un-
disturbed a section of the Mexican main stem which has been developed 
into a park area. Each basin is responsible for delivering one half of 
the required amount or 0.75 MAF. However, 0.75 MAF delivered at Lee 
Ferry by the Upper Basin would be substantially less than that by the 
time it reached the border due to heavy channel and evaporation losses. 
The question of the accounting delivery point may have to be settled by 
litigation, as it is not spelled out in the treaty. 
The treaty is also vague about water quality. Pollution occurred 
much more quickly than expected, emanating from an irrigation project in 
the Wellton-Mohawk District. There a drain was constructed to empty the 
discharge directly into the Colorado so as to charge this amount towards 
the Mexican requirement. The effluent contained approximately 6000 to 
6500 parts per million (ppm) of dissolved solid and resultantly increased 
salinity at the Mexican border from 1100 to 2700 ppm. To avoid potentially 
embarrassing litigation or arbitration, the Wellton-Mohawk drain was ex-
tended so that discharges could bypass the Mexican diversion works at 
Morelos Dam during the low flow winter months. Further measures to improve 
water quality were implemented in 1974 when President Nixon signed the 
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Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act authorizing the construction of 
desalinization plant at the border. 
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (1948). The Upper Basin desired 
to allocate rights among its several states for a very simple reason: 
development was progressing but limited by a lack of storage facilities 
to provide carryover during periods of low runoff; the primary source of 
finance was the federal government who insisted on rights settlement be-
fore putting up any funds. Relative to the Lower Basin's experience, the 
settlement came quickly, for none of the states could gain by delaying. 
The Upper Basin states, realizing the highly variable runoff of the 
Colorado, allocated rights on a percentage basis. With exception of 
Arizona, who in view of her minimal claims as an Upper Basin state was 
given a flat grant of 50,000 acre-feet yearly, the allocations were: 
Colorado, 51.75 percent; Utah, 23 percent; Wyoming, 14 percent; New 
Mexico, 11.25 percent. The Upper Basin adopted the inflow-outflow method 
of delivering consumption so that incentive was provided for salvaging 
channel or other natural losses. While this encourages the efficient use 
of water, it also biases estimated consumption figures downward as there 
is no immediate way to obtain actual on-site consumption. Recall that 
the Lower Basin adopted the diversion less return flows formula which 
was later determined by the Special Master in Arizona v. California to 
apply to the Colorado Compact as a whole. 
The percentage allocations apply only to the 7.5 MAF allocated to 
the Upper Basin by the 1922 Compact. During a surplus additional alloca-
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tations would be determined by the 1922 Compact. During a shortage the 
percentages would not be used to determine curtailment. Instead states 
would have to deliver to Lee Ferry their overdrafts for the preceeding 
ten years, and, this failing to eliminate the deficiency, each state would 
reduce its present consumption by the relative percentage of its use 
during previous years (to 1922) and in a magnitude such that the aggre-
gate would remedy the deficiency at Lee Ferry. 
The Upper Basin was also farsighted enough to allocate reservoir 
losses. For a facility designed to provide storage for in-state use, the 
state bears the loss, while for facilities intended to help meet the Lee 
Ferry obligation, each state is charged with losses in proportion to the 
ratio of its own to total consumptive use. 
While the Upper Basin Compact was intended to divide the Upper 
Basins allocated 7.5 MAF, this must be interpreted in light of the 1922 
Compact and the express commitment on the part of the Upper Basin to de-
liver 7.5 MAF to the Lower Basin. As mentioned earlier the reconstructed 
average virgin runoff at Lee Ferry is approximately 13.5 MAF. Subtracting 
the Lower Basin commitment and the 0.75 MAF requirement to Mexico leaves 
only 5.25 MAF available for Upper Basin consumption, and this figure must 
be diminished by the average evaporation in Lake Powell (0.6 MAF). 
Upper Colorado River Storage Project Act (1956). As soon as the 
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact was approved by Congress in 1949, the 
Upper Colorado River Basin Commission, established by this Compact, began 
urging the approval of the Colorado River Storage Project Act. This work 
culminated in 1956 when the act was approved and construction of storage 
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facilities at Curecanti, Flaming Gorge, Glen Canyon, and Navajo were 
authorized. The Glen Canyon facility was by far the largest with a maxi-
mum storage capacity of 27 MAF, while the other facilities were roughly 
an order of magnitude smaller. The closing of Glen Canyon Dam in 1964, 
a relatively low flow year (10.2 MAF), resulted in 5.6 MAF retained and 
only 2.4 MAF released from the dam. In 1965, a high flow year (18.9 MAF), 
4.9 MAF were retained and 10.8 MAF released. The closing of Glen Canyon 
Dam led to controversy between the Upper and Lower Basins concerning the 
priority to retain water for power and future domestic and agriculture in 
the Upper Basin versus additional power generation and current expansion 
of domestic and agriculture activities in the Lower Basin. In 1968 
Secretary of the Interior Udall ordered that Lower Basin deliveries be 
lowered by 10 percent to facilitate the filling of Lake Powell. Nonethe-
less the ten year period ending in 1973 showed deliveries of 82.9 MAF to 
the Lower Basin, which only barely exceeds the compact requirements (75 
MAF for the Lower Basin plus 7.5 MAF, the Upper Basin charge for deliveries 
to Mexico). 
Colorado River Basin Project Act (1968). Arizona's reluctance to 
ratify the Colorado River Compact was understandable since it provided no 
protection against California, it offered no equivalent to the Boulder 
Canyon Project, it did not restrict Mexico's development, and, by allo-
cating water to the Upper Basin, it limited the quantities of water to 
which she might lay claim. When Arizona finally signed in 1944, her 
prime objective became a high-line canal to the Phoenix-Tucson area. Her 
efforts were rewarded in 1963 following the Supreme Court's final decree 
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in Arizona v. California. After five years of negotiations the canal was 
authorized as the Central Arizona Project. However, California approval 
was bought at the Cost of a major concession: an absolute priority for 
Califonia of 4.4 MAF. Thus the viability of the Central Arizona Project 
depends on the importation of 2.5 MAF of water yearly into the Colorado 
River Basin: 1.5 MAF to satisfy the Mexican Treaty and 1 MAF allowed for 
losses. At that time there would be adequate water to supply 4.4 MAF to 
California, 2.8 MAF to Arizona, and 0.3 MAF to Nevada.* However, strong 
protest from Pacific Northwest representatives resulted in the inclusion 
of another provision banning interbasin transfer studies for ten years. 
In this form the bill was approved in 1968 and became known as the Colorado 
River Basin Project Act. The authorized cost of the project was 1.3 bil-
lion dollars and the project has met with continued opposition along the 
way. Scheduled completion is around 1985. 
As a result of the interbasin clash concerning the use of surplus 
water for Upper Basin storage versus Lower Basin power, the Colorado River 
Basin Project Act also instructed the Secretary of the Interior to de-
velop criteria for the operation of federal reservoirs. Water was to be 
released from Lake Powell with priorities: (i) the treaty obligation to 
Mexico; (ii) the Lower Basin's right to 75 MAF per ten years; (iii) main-
tenance of carryover storage necessary for (i) and (ii). Detailed cri-
teria for maintaining parity in storage levels between Lakes Mead and 
Powell were published by the Secretary of the Interior in 1970. 
*See Meyers, p. 73. 
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Federal and Indian Rights. In the Arizona v. California fina l de-
cree Indian reservations and other federal establishments were allocated 
rights to use water in an amount sufficient to guarantee use of the land 
for the purpose it was established. Priority and perfected right status 
were determined as of the date the establishment was created. Although 
the 1922 Compact and the Upper Basin Compact asserted that Indian rights 
would not be affected, these rights were not then delineated. Triba l 
water claims are based on the Winters doctrine, which claims tha t the 
water rights are preserved with the reservation of the land. 
While many Indian rights have not been quantified, some have been. 
In Arizona v. California some Lower Basin Indian rights a ggr egating 
about 1 MAP were specified. When unquantified and unexerc ised Indian 
and federal rights are asserted, further shortages can be expec ted with 
accompanying litigation . 
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IV. HISTORICAL PATTERN OF USE OF THE COLORADO RIVER 
Despite the lengthy and complex negotiations concerning water rights 
to the Colorado River, in fact the river has never been over-appropriated 
in use; the battle over rights is concerned with the future shortages that 
will occur, perhaps as soon as the late 1980's. In this section, we sum-
marize the historical record of flows of the Colorado River, together with 
the pattern of use of the river. 
Lee Ferry is the dividing point on the river between the Upper and 
Lower Basin states, and represents the base position so far as measured 
flows of the river are concerned. The approach adopted by the Bureau of 
Reclamation is to "reconstruct" the so-called "virgin flow" of the river 
at Lee Ferry for each water year. (Each water year ends on September 
30.) The reconstruction is accomplished by measuring the actual flow of 
the river at Lee Ferry (or, more precisely, at two monitoring positions 
located near Lee Ferry). To this physical flow are added several esti-
mates: an estimate of depletions that have taken place during the year 
in the Upper Basin upstream from Lee Ferry; an estimate of increases in 
reservoir storage in the Upper Basin during the year (increases in sur-
face storage at upstream reservoirs plus increases in bank storage at 
such reservoirs); and to this subtotal is added an estimate of evaporation 
losses at upstream reservoirs. The resulting figure, actual flows at Lee 
Ferry plus Upper Basin depletions plus increases in Upper Basin reservoir 
storage plus evaporative losses at Upper Basin reservoirs, is the estimate 
of the reconstructed virgin flow at Lee Ferry for the water year. The 
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reconstructed virgin flow figure is thus an estimate of the quantity of 
water that would have flowed through Lee Ferry in the absence of man-
made depletions and storage facilities in the upper stream. 
The appendix to this paper contains several tables giving detailed 
data on water availability and use for the Colorado River. Appendix 
Table 1 presents a detailed breakdown of physical flows at Lee Ferry 
and estimated virgin flows for the period 1896-1975. A summary of these 
data is the following. 
Period 
1900-09 
1910-19 
1920-29 
1930-39 
1940-49 
1950-59 
1960-69 
170-75 
Source: 
Average Annual Historical and Virgin Flows at Lee Ferry 
Selected Periods, 1900-1975 
(all data in thousands of acre-feet) 
Historical Upper Basin 
flows deEletions 
15,140 1,100 
15,500 1,660 
16,190 2,000 
10,750 1, 710 
12,650 1,890 
10,810 2,030 
7,930 .2,320 
9,050 2,850 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Changes in 
U.B. storage 
2,140 
2,850 
Evap. losses 
U.B. reser. 
170 
530 
Virgin 
flow 
16,130 
17,160 
18,190 
12,460 
14,540 
12 '840 
12,570 
15,180 
The historical flows column of the above table shows the average 
annual measured physical flow of water at Lee Ferry for each period. It 
is clear that prior to the 1960's the Compact imposed no constraint on the 
amount of water that was made available to the Lower Basin states, since 
physical flows far exceeded the mandated deliveries from the Upper Basin 
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to the Lower Basin. With the closing of Glen Canyon and the other storage 
dams in the Upper Basin in the early '60's, deliveries of water at Lee 
Ferry begin to approximate the Compact requirements. Note also that de-
pletions in the Upper Basin plus evaporation losses at Upper Basin reser-
voirs (both chargeable to the Upper Basin under the Compact) are still, 
in the most recent period, only 50 percent of the 6.75 MAF per year allo-
cated to the Upper Basin under the Compact. The percentage rises to over 
60 percent, however, if the projected annual virgin flow of the Colorado 
is reduced from 15 MAF to 13.5 MAF per year, with the Upper Bssin bearing 
the burden of its guaranteed deliveries of 75 MAF each ten year period to 
the Lower Basin (plus 7.5 MAF for the Upper Basin share of Mexico deliv-
eries). 
The virgin flow column gives a clear indication of the unusually 
high flows in the first three decades of this century relative to later 
periods, and the consequent overallocating of the river by the signers 
of the Compact. 
Finally, the table indicates that the character of the policy 
problems involved in the Colorado River region changed markedly beginning 
with the 1960's. Upper Basin depletions had shown only a gradual growth 
over time up to the closing of Glen Canyon, but they are now increasing 
at a rapid rate. At present rate of increase in depletions, the Upper 
Basin will have met or exceeded its allocation of 5.25 MAF per year 
(assuming a 13.5 MAF per year virgin flow) by 1990. In anticipation 
of this eventuality, almost 40 MAF had been stored in Upper Basin reser-
voirs (including both bank and surface storage) by 1975. This in turn 
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has led to a substantial amount of evaporation losses, amounting annually 
to 10 percent of the Upper Basin allocation for the period 1970-75. 
Turning to the Lower Basin, we can inventory its water situation as 
follows. The Lower Basin receives as its primary water input the physical 
flow of the Colorado at Lee Ferry, to which is added the flow of tribu-
taries entering the mainstream below Lee Ferry (primarily the Little 
Colorado, Bill Williams River, and the Gila River), plus intermittent 
flows from minor rivers and washes. Offsetting these additions to the 
mainstream are evaporative losses that occur between Lee Ferry and the 
points at which diversions take place. While historical data are not 
available for as long a period for the Lower Basin as for the Upper Basin , 
relatively complete information is available for the period 1964-73. 
These data are presented in Appendix Table 2. We summarize this informa-
tion on availability and uses of mainstream water for the Loser Basin in 
the following table. 
Average Annual Availability and Use of Mainstream Wa ter, 
Colorado River, Lower Basin, 1964-1973 
(all data . in thousands of acre-feet) 
Availability 
Historic flow at Lee Ferry 
Net Inflow, Lee Ferry-Lake Mead 
Inflow, Lake Mead-North Border 
Total Mainstream Water Available 
Uses 
Net diversions, Lower Basin 
Increase in storage, L.B. reservoirs 
L.B. reservoir evaporation losses 
Channel and other losses 
Flow at North Border 
Total Mainstream Water Uses 
Source: Bureau of Reclamation 
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Annual Average, 1964 -73 
8,272 
868 
87 
9, 227 
6,484 
407 
706 
258 
1,372 
9,227 
As indicated in the table, deliveries to the Lower Basin at Lee 
Ferry over the period 1964-73 almost exactly match the Compact require-
ments of 8.25 MAF per year (7.5 MAF for Lower Basin use, .75 MAF of Upper 
Basin deliveries to meet the commitment to Mexico) each ten year period. 
To these deliveries were added 955,000 acre-feet in Lower Basin tributary 
flows, but these are offset by 964,000 acre-feet of losses per year 
(reservoir evaporative losses, and channel and other losses). Thus, 
during the 1964-73 period, the Lower Basin had available for consumptive 
use essentially its Compact allocation of 6 . 75 MAF per year, after pro-
viding for deliveries to Mexico. The allocation was not completely used, 
as is indicated by the fact that reservoir storage increased an average 
of 407,000 acre-feet per year. Data shown in the table are somewhat mis-
leading as to consumptive use in the Lower Basin and deliveries to Mexico. 
Consumptive use in the Lower Basin is defined as diversions from the river 
less returns to the river. As it turns out, some 140,000 acre-feet per 
year of returns to the river occur below the North Border point. These 
returns must be added to the flow at the North Border to obtain deliveries 
to Mexico, and must be deducted from the net diversions figure to obtain 
an estimate of consumptive use in the Lower Basin. Thus average annual 
consumptive use for the 1964-73 period in the Lower Basin was approximately 
6,344,000 acre-feet, some 406,000 acre-feet below the 6 . 75 MAF allocated 
under the Compact. The Lower Basin thus used roughly 94 percent of its 
allocation over the 1964-73 period . 
While total consumptive use of the Colorado River by the Lower 
Basin in recent years closely approximates the Lower Basin allocation 
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under the Compact, the pattern of use among Lower Basin states differs 
markedly from the allocation decreed in Arizona v.California. The 
Supreme Court allocated 4.4 MAF per year to California, 2.8 MAF to 
Arizona, and .3 MAF to Nevada, all to be reduced on an equitable basis 
to meet requirements for deliveries to Mexico. Assuming a prorata 
sharing of Mexican deliveries, the Arizona v. California allocation is 
4.0 MAF to California, 2.52 MAP to Arizona, and .27 MAF to Nevada. 
Actual consumptive use over the 1964-73 period was 5.096 MAF annually 
by California, 1.162 MAF annually by Arizona, and 48,000 acre-feet 
annually by Nevada. (See Appendix Table 3 for detailed data on con-
sumptive use by states within the Lower Basin.) In 1974, California's 
use had increased to 5.4 MAP, Arizona to 1.3 MAF, and Nevada to just 
under 100,000 acre-feet, amounting to a total of 6.8 MAF. 
What this means for the future is that when the CAP comes on line, 
Arizona will be using its full quota of 2.52 MAF; California use must 
be cut back from its 1974 level by 1.4 MAF; and Nevada can expand its 
usage by some 170,000 acre-feet per year. Within California, assuming 
that the appropriative system is applied strictly on the basis of 
seniority, the Metropolitan Water District will be cut back substan-
tially (to perhaps 150,000 acre-feet per year from 1974 consumption 
of 1,122,000 acre-feet), with only minor cutbacks for the Imperial 
Valley, Coachella Valley, Palo Verde and Yuma Irrigation Districts. 
Appendix Table 4 summarizes consumptive use by major users within 
California, Arizona, and Nevada for the period 1964-74. As noted 
earlier, usage by present holders of rights will also be affected by 
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the amount of water allocated to Indian reservations under Arizona v. 
California and subsequent litigation. Within Arizona, the Colorado 
River Indian Reservation has increased its consumptive use from 180,000 
acre-feet in 1964 to 298,000 acre-feet in 1974, and is now the second 
largest user in Arizona. 
A matter of central importance to the management of the Colorado 
River is water storage policy. There are nine major storage reservoirs 
on the Colorado, six located in the Upper Basin and three in the Lower 
Basin. Lake Powell behind Glen Canyon is the largest of the Upper Basin 
reservoirs, and Lake Mead is the largest in the Lower Basin. Until 1963, 
when Glan Canyon was closed, the Upper Basin had little or no control 
over flows to the Lower Basin, resulting in deliveries far in excess 
of the Compact requirements. Glen Canyon was built just north of Lee 
Ferry, so that no uncontrolled Upper Basin tributary flows now enter the 
Lower Basin. Since Upper Basin use of the Colorado is substantially 
less than its allocation under the Compact, and since the Upper Basin 
now delivers essentailly its mandated quantities to the Lower Ba sin, 
there has been a buildup of storage in Upper Basin reservoirs since 
1963, amounting to approximately 40 MAF by 1975 (includes both surface 
and bank storage). Over the same time, Lower Basin reservoirs have in-
creased storage levels as well, but at a much slower rate. Appendix 
Tables 5 and 6 present data on storage levels and changes in storage 
for the nine storage reservoirs, 1964-75. The status of the storage 
reservoirs as of September 30, 1975 is sununarized in the following 
table. 
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UPPER BASIN 
Lake Powell 
Flaming Gorge 
Navajo 
Blue Mesa 
Fontenelle 
Morrow Point 
Total 
LOWER BASIN 
Lake Mead 
Lake Mohave 
Lake Havasu 
Total 
USABLE CAPACITY AND ACTIVE STORAGE 
COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1975 
(thousands of Acre-Feet) 
GROSS CAP. 
27,000 
3,789 
1,709 
941 
345 
117 
33,901 
28,537 
1,818 
648 
31,003 
USABLE CAP.* 
25,002 
3,749 
1,696 
830 
345 
117 
31,739 
26,159 
1,810 
619 
28,588 
ACT. STORAGE** 
20,202 
3,650 
1,393 
695 
329 
116 
26,385 
20,154 
1,385 
573 
22,112 
Colorado River Total 64,904 60,327 48 ,497 
i.STOR./US . CAP. 
80.8% 
97.3% 
81.8% 
83.6% 
95.4% 
99.1% 
83.3% 
77.0i. 
76.5% 
92.4% 
77.3% 
80.4% 
Source: Annual Reports, Colorado River Board of California, 1964-1975. 
*Usable capacity is less than gross capacity by the amount of loss in 
capacity due to sedimentation accumulations in the reservoirs. 
**Active storage includes only surface storage; bank storage is excluded. 
As of September 30, 1975, 80 percent of the active storage capacity 
on the Colorado River was being used, with Lower Basin reservoirs having 
a slightly larger amount of available capacity than Upper Basin reser-
voirs. With over 48 MAF of surface storage, reservoir evaporation losses 
for the entire system had reached 1.5 MAF for the year 1975, something 
over 10 percent of the virgin flow of the river. There were 12 MAF of 
available surface storage capacity on the river as of September 30, 
1975. At the rate of increase in surface storage for the 1975 water 
year {approximately 3.6 MAF), the storage capacity of the system would 
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be fully utilized by 1978 . Actually, the situation is even tighter than 
these numbers indicate, since a part of the usable capacity of the system 
must be set aside for flood control purposes, the amount varying with 
the time of year; there must be excess capacity of at least 1.5 MAF in 
the fall of the year, and at least 5.35 MAF of excess capacity on 
January 1 of each year, in order to meet the requirements of the Flood 
Control Act of December 22, 1944 as amended in 1968. 
The use of flows beyond the needs of the Upper Basin as additions 
to Upper Basin storage rather than being applied to potential conswnptive 
use in the Lower Basin is clearly inefficient unless such storage pro-
vides insurance benefits for the future that more than offset the gains 
from current usage of the river, including those foregone by and attrib-
utable to evaporation losses at the storage reservoirs. Thus a funda-
mental question to raise concerning the management of the Colorado River 
system is that of an optimal policy for storing water in the system. It 
is clearly in the interests of Upper Basin states to store as much water 
as possible during periods of time in which Upper Basin depletions fall 
short of the allocation under the Compact. Likewise it is in the in-
terest of the Upper Basin to locate a dam like Glen Canyon far enough 
south so that all Upper Basin tributaries can be controlled. However, 
neither of these actions may be socially desirable. 
One interesting consequence of the storage accumulation over the 
past ten years is the possibility in the near future that the Lower 
Basin might have to bear the brunt of the variability of stream flows. 
With storage at capacity in the Upper Basin, excess flows to the Lower 
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Basin can tax the capacity of the Lower Basin to store and/or use on a 
current basis, water that is delivered to it. Since the Upper Basin is 
only held to a ten-year requirement, large flows in one or two years 
can be used to offset small flows in future years . Even with adequate 
storage capacity available in the Lower Basin, the effect of a highly 
variable policy of flows from the Upper Basin is to transfer to the 
Lower Basin the cost, in terms of evaporation losses, of providing 
insurance as to a more or less constant flow of water for consumptive 
use within the Lower Basin. The full implications of the incentive struc-
ture of the Compact so far as storage of water is concerned, deserve de-
tailed study. 
The rules for sharing shortages among the individual states have 
been elaborated above. Recapitulating, the Lower Basin states are pro-
rated downward in proportion to their rights; Upper Basin states follow 
a more complicated formula based on previous use or overuse of water. 
For users within Upper Basin states the likelihood of curtailment depends 
on the priority of the right. Unfortunately, due to the large number of 
small users, it is not possible to delineate the order of priorities for 
users in those states . In the Lower Basin states the exis t ence of a sma ll 
number of large contracts renders the situation more tractable. Table 
7 presents the priorities to use of Colorado River water in California 
in order of decreasing seniority. 
Priority dates for various water uses in Arizona are still in dis-
pute and have not yet been fully established by the courts. Article VI 
of the Supreme Court Decree in Arizona v. California called for Arizona, 
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California, and the United States to prepare lists of present perfected 
rights, with claimed priority dates, in terms of consumptive use of main-
stream waters in each state. Lists of present perfected rights were sub-
mitted by the three states and the United States, but because of various 
reasons, they have not been able to reach agreement on their claims and 
have continued to assemble and exchange information in an effort to reac h 
agreement. At the present time, the parties are considering a draft 
stipulation for present perfected rights including miscellaneous c laims, 
and approval of the stipulation is expected in the near future. In addi-
tion, numerous rights have been perfected by contract, decree, or federal 
project with priority dates subsequent to June 25, 1929. 
Table 8 shows rights of current and projected uses relative to the 
Central Arizona Project. Table 9 shows the projected operation of the 
Colorado River with addition of CAP diversions. Information concerning 
priorities of rights for Nevada's share of the Colorado River has not 
yet been obtained. 
In summation several problems are obvious. In the Upper Basin 
overallocation of the Colorado River will occur in the next five to 
fifteen years . This will be hastened due to the resurrection of federal 
and Indian reserved rights, and thepresence of large evaporative losses 
due to high Upper Basin storage levels. Shortages in the Upper Basin 
diminish even further the possibility of deliveries to the Lower Basin 
in excess of requirements. With this in mind the Lower Basin supplies 
will be drastically overallocated with the connnencement of CAP flow 
In 1985. The catalysts which ensure this occurrence are the recognition 
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of federal and Indian reserved rights, the failure to account for 
Mexican requirements vis-a-vis the allocations to individual states, 
and the neglect of evapotranspiration and channel losses concomitant 
to Mexican deliveries. Realization of these circumstances will high-
light the social costs of maintaining high storage levels in both 
basins. 
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APPENDIX: 
TABLES 1 THROUGH 9 
-- Historlcal 
Year Ending Flow at 
9/30 Lee Ferry 
1:396 9,760 
97 17,500 
98 13' 300 
99 15,250 
1900 12, 600 
01 12,900 
02 8,740 
-- 03 13,950 
04 14,700 
1905 15,000 
06 17, 964 
07 22,003 
08 11, 763 
09 21, 706 
---1910 12, 969 
11 14,622 
12 18,880 
13 12,994 
l '• 19 ,3J5 
l'Jl 5 12,500 
16 17,325 
-- l? 21,893 
18 13,650 
E 10,858 
- 192C 19,739 
21 20,717 
22 16,302 
-- 23 16,261 
24 _11,~81 
1925 11,341 
TABLE 1 
UPPER COLORADO BASIN -- DEPLETIONS, CHANGES IN 
STORAGE, EVAPORATION LOSSES, AND VIRGIN FLOW 
AT LEE FERRY, 1896-1795 
(All Figures in Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
U~Eer Basin DeEletions Changes in Storage 
Within Trans- Transbasl.n Surface 
Total Basin Basin Total Rese rvoirs Storage 
-
329 329 
509 509 
515 515 
624 624 
628 628 
682 682 
653 653 
85 7 855 2 
945 942 3 
1,027 1.020 7 
1,157 1.144 13 
1, 399 l,385 14 
1,093 1,076 17 
1.569 1 552 17 
1,279 1 265 14 
1,406 1,389 17 
1,640 1,624 16 
1,4 79 1,401 78 
1,887 1. 763 124 
1,528 1.465 63 
1. 8 76 1, 771 105 
2,145 2,055 90 
1, 7 L4 1,651 63 
1,605 1, 532 73 
2,212 2,093 lJ 9 
2,301 2 193 108 
2,004 1.905 99 
2,009 1 905 1011 
lJ. 721 1 672 49 
L!..:..£93 1,631 62 
Bank Net Evap- Virgin 
Storage Other oralive Loss Flow 
10 ,089 
18 009 1 ___ 
13 I 8 L5 
15,874 
13 ,22~ 
13,582 
9,39 3 
14 .~0 7 
15 ,(145 
161-027 
19,121 
23,40~ 
12, 8)h 
23,275 
14,248 
16,028 
20, ):!O_ 
14,472 
2!. .. t.?_;_~ 
1~_9!.8 
19 I :.:.ol 
24 iiQ.~ 
15 364 
1~2_l 
21,951 
23,0LG 
18,J06 
18,270 
14,202 
J3,()J~ 
-Historical Upper Basin Depletions 
Year Ending Flow at Within Trans-
9/30 Lee Ferry Total Basin Basin 
1926 14 2008 1,3115 1 768 77 
27 16.587 2,030 1,919 111 
28 15 2323 l.9 .'.i 7 1,851 106 
29 19!223 2,206 2,097 109 
1S30 13,070 ~16 1.740 76 
31 6,388 1,381 1 339 42 
32 15,286 1.958 1.864 94 
33 9,745 l,612 1,533 79 
34 4,396 1,245 1,215 30 
1935 9 2912 1.638 1,547 91 
36 11,970 l.831 1.671 160 
37 11,897 1 843 1.670 173 
38 15!440 2,106 1,892 214 
39 9!394 1,685 1,532 153 
19'10 7,082 1.519 1,380 139 
41 16~2 /. 097 1. 919 178 
42 17,029 2,097 1. 974 123 
43 11.263 1.841 1,643 198 
--44 13,221 1,934 l,767 167 
1945 11 2545 1,866 1,657 209 
46 8! 71~5 1,681 1,490 191 
47 1315111 1,957 1, 780 177 
48 131687 1, 926 1, 781 145 
49 14 2 359 2.017 1,824 193 
1950 11 205 7 l.837 1,626 211 
51 91831 1.816 1,554 262 
52 171980 2 '348 2.092 256 
53 8,805 1,907 1,513 394 
54 6, 116 l,8L. 2 l, 343 499 
1955 71307 1.922 1,431 491 
TABLE 1 
(Continued) 
Changes in Storage 
Trans basin Surface 
Total Reservoirs Storage 
-
337 337 
- 76 - 76 
-297 -297 
- 41 - 41 
Bank Net Evap- Virgin 
Storage Other orative Loss Flow 
15,853 
18.617 
17.280 
21,429 
14 ,886 
7 769 
17 244 
11, 35 7 
5,641 
11 ,550 
13 ,801 
13' 740 
17 ,546_ 
11,079 
8,601 
18,149 
19,126 
13,104 
15. 155 
13, 411 
10,426 
15 ,4 71 
15 ,613 
16,376 
12 ,894 
11,647 
20,665 
10,636 
7,661 
9,138 
His torical 
Year Ending Flow at 
9/30 Lee Ferry 
1956 8 .750 
57 17,340 
'.i8 14,260 
59 6 .756 
1%0 9.192 
61 6 .6 74 
62 111. 785 
63 2 .520 
64 2,427 
1965 10 ,835 
66 7.870 
67 7,823 
68 8,358 
69 8,850 
19 '/0 8,688 
71 8,607 
72 9,330 
73 10,141 
., {i 82277 
1975l7 92274 
Upper Bas in Depletions 
Within Trans-
Total Basin Basin 
1.993 1,520 473 
2 ,482 2,059 423 
2,233 1,851 382 
1,918 1,394 524 
2 , 060 1,548 512 
1,797 1,390 407 
2. 391 1, 896 495 
1,876 1 ,390 486 
2 ,0 7 .~ 1 , 481 597 
2 , 596 2 ,096 500 
2 , 568 2,084 484 
2 , 661 2,109 554 
2,611 2 ,142 471 
2 , 600 2 ,134 466 
2,625 2'] 39 486 
2,667 2,130 537 
2' 77() 2 ,152 6.18 
2 ,833 2 ,154 679 
7 ,BtJ 2,1Z2 q.ll_ 
2,84') 2,176 673 
TABLE 1 
(Continued) 
Changes in Storage 
Transbasin Surface 
Total Reservoirs Storage 
6 6 
273 273 
-
4 - 4 
- 65 - 65 
11 11 
- 14 - 14 
123 81 38 
4,015 -197 3 ' 738 
5,507 - 51 4,389 
5 , 245 452 3,558 
462 - 250 3 
1,133 SJ 553 
2,386 137 1,251 
2, 576 203 2,071 
3, 682 104 2,579 
3,096 9 2' 164 
-653 - so - 704 
5 , 805 95 5,209 
... -L..163 - 2~ 612 
4,0J8 + 35 +2,761 
1_/ Provisional records subject to revision. 
Bank Net Evap- Virgin 
Storage Other orative Loss Flow 
10 , 749 
LU,09) 
l b , 489 
8 ,b0"9" 
lJ , 26J 
8 , 4)/ 
4 11,2159" 
474 39 8 , 4'..llr 
1,169 144 l u,l)b 
977 258 L.J/ 18. 913 
884 -175 JU I 11,208 
437 60 288 lI, 9D7 
659 339 30 I · 13 , oo4 
291 11 JbU 14, Jtso 
929 70 410 !5 ,4lJS' 
860 63 4/0 14,846 
180 - 79 494 II,9U 
313 188 5Z1S 19,327 
918 - 280 615 ~4 
941 +281 6 30 16 '771 
TA~LE 2 
AVAILABILITY AND USES OF MAINSTREAM WATER -- LOWER BASIN 
1964-1973 WATER YEARS 
(All Figures in Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
AVAILABILITY USES 
His torical Net Inflow Inflow* Tot al Change In Change In Reservoir Ne t ** Channel Flow 
Water Inf lows L. Ferry- L. Mead Water Surface Bank Evap. Diversions & Other at Total 
Year Lees Ferry L. Mead N. Border Avail. Storage Storage Losses In L. Basin Losses*** N. Border Uses 
1964 2 414 751 35 3,200 - 5,514 -354 709 6,359 381 1,617 3,198 
65 10,820 821 119 11,760 2,947 189 603 6 ,252 315 1,454 11, 760 
66 7,854 916 224 8,994 304 18 680 6,182 300 1.511 8,995 
67 7,797 987 68 8,852 275 17 643 6,406 179 1,331 8,851 
68 8,334 847 65 9,246 634 42 634 6,267 345 1,323 9.245 
69 8,823 1,065 39 9,927 1.170 72 683 6 ,391 300 1,310 9,926 
1970 8 , 672 656 23 9,351 563 41 712 6,453 288 1,293 9,350 
71 8.591 577 17 9,185 200 8 770 6 773 123 1,313 9,187 
72 9 , 311 383 7 9,701 517 37 759 7, 000 71 1,317 9,700 
73 10, 108 1,676 268 12, 052 2,731 177 866 6.753 274 1.250 12,051 
.... --... 
--- --
..... ......... _ 
--- -- -- -
, ...... 
---
... ... -..... 10 Yr. A\ - -?_7 &_ _ _ _ lj~/~_ ljblj _ lj/ ____ ~_,_f_Ll_I__ ____ JljJ _ --~_) __ ._/l.lb__~4M ___ L)lj --~_Jj_L ~ 
Source: Based on communica t ion from Alden Briggs , U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
* Bill Williams River and Gila River. 
** Equal to consumptive use (diversions less returns) except that Mohawk- Wellton returns bypassing Morales Dam 
are not deducted. 
*** Includes channel evaporation losses, unmeasured inflows , diversions and r eturn flows not otherwise accounted 
for, changes in channel , surface and bank storage , except in reservoirs. 
(Note: Flow at North Border equals deliveries t o Mexico less returns to river between the North and South 
bor ders that are creditable to Mexico unde r the t r eaty provisions. This amounts to around 140,000 
acre-feet per year . ) 
~ 
TABLE 3 
CONSUMPTIVE USE -- LOWER COLORADO BASIN 
1964-1974 
(Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
Cal. Total Diversions 
Year (Exel. Mexico) California Arizona Nevada To Mexico 
1964 6,217.2 5,064.7 1,127.2 25.3 n.a. 
1965 5 ,931.2 4,900.0 1,008.5 22.7 1,687.7 
1966 6,196.7 5,096.9 1,073.1 26.7 1,656.1 
1967 5,958.3 4,886.7 1,042.4 27.2 1,559.0 
1968 6,203.5 5,072.5 1,097.4 33.6 1,562.7 
1969 6,061.0 4,896.5 1,127.1 37.4 1,565.8 
1970 6,240 .1 5,015.0 1,186.8 38.3 1,583.2* 
1971 6,522.7 5,174 .3 1,297.8 50 . 6 1,561.6* 
1972 6,547.0 5,230.6 1,235.3 81.1 1,612.5* 
1973 6,682.0 5,317 .5 1,271.9 92.6 1,625.2* 
1974 6,834.5 5,414.0 1,325.6 94.9 1,665.4* 
*Diversions to Mexico include water delivered pursuant to Minute 
241 of U.S.-Mexico agreement of amounts : 54.6 (1970); 55 . 2 (1971); 
86.3 (1972); 119.1 (1973); 159.2 (1974). 
Source: Compilation of Records in Accordance with Article V of the 
Decree of the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona V. California, March 9, 
1964. Annual issues, 1964-1974, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
TABLE 4 
USERS OF LOWER BASIN WATER, BY STATES , 1964-1974 
(Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
Calendar Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
CALIFORNIA 
Total 5064.7 4900.0 5096. 9 4886.7 5072 .5 4896. 5 5015.0 5174.3 5230 .6 5317.5 5414.0 
MWD of So. Calif. 1134. 5 1178.1 1146.2 1122.6 1181.5 1128 . 6 1200.4 1212.0 1212 .0 1170 .1 1121.8 
Palo Verde Irr. Dist . 397 .8 350.8 404.6 363 . 5 393.5 393 . 7 410.1 458.6 439. 6 465.3 458.4 
Yuma Res. Dist. 72.6 63.5 69.0 67.5 74.2 65 .0 66.7 62.9 58.0 64.3 60.6 
Im2erial Valley Irr. Dist. 2891. 2 274L3 2944 . 5 2819.7 2895.5 2766.9 2848.6 2932.5 2965 . 9 304 7. 9 3172 .o 
Coachella Valley Irr. Dist. 526.4 524.7 489.4 464.1 478 . 6 495.1 449.3 464.4 511.5 522.4 558 . 9 
Other 42 . 2 41. 7 43 . 2 49 . 4 49.3 47.3 40.1 43.8 39.4 48.1 42.5 
ARIZONA 
Total 1127.2 1008.5 1073.1 1042.4 1097.4 1127.1 1186 .8 1297.8 1235.3 1271. 9 1325.6 
Colo. River Indian Res. 180.0 161.5 202 .0 204 . 8 232.8 218.6 228.2 297.2 269 . 2 303 .2 298.4 
No. Gila R. Irr. Dist. 39.9 36.0 44.3 40.2 41.0 40.4 44.9 45.0 44.7 49.4 51.3 
Wellton-Mohawk Irr. Dist. 301.3 286.1 276.3 262.9 260.8 283.4 296 .1 318.9 293.5 289.9 339.9 
Yuma Co. Water Ass'n. 163.8 155.4 191.0 181.3 183.2 163 . 9 168.6 179.2 189.0 222.9 230.2 
Yuma Mesa and So. Gila R. 284.6 235.8 219.8 213 . 5 234.7 253.7 269.1 260 . 7 240.3 251 . 2 255.1 
Unit B Irr. Dist. 41. 7 37.9 40.3 37.9 39.4 37.5 40 . 2 40.8 38.5 38.5 39.8 
Havasu Nat'l Wildlife Res. - - - - - 28.6 36.1 32.3 35 .8 40.8 31. 9 
Ot her 96.9 95 . 8 99.4 101.8 105.3 111.0 103.5 123.7 124.3 76.0 79.0 
NEVADA 
Total 25.3 22.7 26.7 27 . 2 33.6 37.4 38.3 50.6 81.1 94.6 98.9 
Basic Mgt. Inc. 16.2 16.1 18.1 18.8 22.9 24.0 20.9 19.7 19.7 19.8 19. 3 
Las Vegas Water Dist. 5.9 3.6 5.3 4.6 6.9 9.7 13.4 20. 7 42.7 49.7 49.6 
Other 4.2 3 .0 3 . 3 3 . 8 3.8 3. 7 4.0 10.2 ] 8. 7 25.1 30.0 
Source: Compilation of Records in Accordance with Article V of the Decree of the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona 
V. California, March 9, 1964. Annual issues, 1964-1975, U. S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
Lake 
Total Powell 
1964 5.966 4.214 
1965 9,529 6,466 
1966 9.427 6.423 
1967 9 ,971 6,300 
1968 11.509 7,514 
1969 13, 725 9,708 
1970 16,264 12 ,039 
1971 18,509 13,609 
1972 17,820 12.488 
1973 23,025 17,284 
1974 23,609 18.0ll 
1975 26,385 20,202 
TABLE 5 
ACTIVE STORAGE LEVELS -- COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 
1964-1975 
(Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
Upper Basin 
Flaming Blue Fonte- Morrow 
Gorge Navaio Mesa Nelle Point Total 
1.460 253 - 14 - 13,510 
2,475 570 
-
18 - 16,635 
2,454 334 192 24 - 16,956 
2. 7 31 451 430 17 - 16,337 
2,ll9 848 658 303 67 16. 96 7 
1,826 1,144 720 286 41 18' 137 
1,793 1,261 810 246 117 18,702 
2,931 993 532 327 ll7 18,901 
3,465 898 5ll 343 ll6 19,419 
3,180 1, 39 3 716 337 ll5 22,150 
3,583 1,010 578 315 ll2 21,301 
3,650 1,393 695 329 ll6 22,ll2 
Source: Annual Reports, Colorado River Board of California, 1964-1975. 
lo 
Lower Basin 
Lake Lake Lake 
Mead Mohave Havasu 
ll.623 1,321 546 
14. 708 1,377 550 
15.004 1,387 565 
14.375 1.402 560 
15,018 1,395 536 
16 ,131 1,441 565 
16,769 1.176 537 
16,886 1,441 574 
17,543 1,404 564 
20'176 1,412 562 
19,358 1.380 563 
20,154 1.385 573 
•• 
Change From 
Previous 
Year (9/30) I Total 
1964-1965 + 3,563 
1965-1966 - 102 
1966-196 7 + 544 
1967-1968 + 1,537 
1968-1969 + 2,053 
1969-1970 + 2,538 
1970-1971 + 2,245 
1971-1972 - 689 
1972-1973 + 5,205 
1973-1q74 + 584 
1974- 1975 + 2, 776 
1964-1975 +20,519 
TABLE 6 
CHANGES IN ACTIVE STORAGE -- COLORADO RIVER RESERVOIRS 
1964-1975 
(Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
Upper Basin Lower Basin 
Lake Flaming Blue Fonte- Morrow Lake Lake Lake 
Powell Gorge Navajo Mesa Nelle Point I Total Mead Mohave Havasu 
+ 2,252 + 990 + 317 - + 4 - I +3,125 __ -t-h085 +36 + 4 
- 43 - 21 - 236 +192 + 6 - I + 321 + 296 +10 +15 
- 63 + 259 + 117 +238 - 7 - I + 275 + 265 +15 - 5 
+ 1,154 - 595 + 397 +228 +286 + 67 I + 631 + 643 
- 9 - 3 
+ 2,194 - 293 + 133 + 62 - 17 - 26 I +1,170 +1,113 +48 + 9 
+ 2,331 - 35 + 117 + 90 - 41 + 76 I + 565 + 638 - 65 - 8 
+ 1,570 +1,140 - 268 - 278 + 81 o I + 199 + 117 +65 +17 
- 1,121 + 534 - 95 - 21 + 15 - 1 I + 518 + 565 -37 -10 
+ 4,796 - 285 + 495 +205 - 5 - l I +2,731 +2,725 + 8 - 2 
+ 727 + 403 - 383 - 138 - 22 - 3 I - 849 - 818 - 32 + 1 
+ 2,191 + 67 + 383 +117 + 14 + 4 I + 811 + 796 + 5 +10 
+16,088 +2,165 +1,140 +695 +315 +116 I +8,602 +8,531 +44 +27 
Source: Annual Reports, Colorado River Board of California, 1964-1975. 
• 
- . 
TABLE 7 
PRIORITIES TO USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER IN CALIFORNIA 
UNDER SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 18, 1931 
Priority 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
•• 
5. 
6. 
(a) 
(b) 
Agency and description 
Pa_lo Verd~ I rriga tion District--104,500 acres in and adjoining exist-• 
mg d1stnct. _____ ----- ___________________________________ ---
Yuma Project (California Division)-not exceeding 25,000 acres ___ _ 
) 
Imperial I rrigation District and lands in I mperial and Coachella 
Valleys to be served by All-American Canal_ ______ ____________ _ 
I 
Palo Verde I rrigation District-16,000 acres of adjoining n~esa. - - - - ' I 
Metropolitan Water District, City of Los Angeles and/ or others ,n ·.he 
coastal plain _____ __________ ______ __ __ ------_- ----- -- ___ ------1 
(a) Metropolitan Water District, City of Los Angeles and/or others <:n the 
coastal plain ._________________________________________ _ _ ____ _ 
(b) City and/or County of San Diego·---- -------------- ------ · -------
(a) Imperial Irrigation District and land!;. in Imperial and Coachcllaf 
Valleys to be sc:vcd by Al!-Amencan Cana'--------- -----------
(b) Palo Verde I rrigation D istrict-16,000 acres of adjoining mesa •• ____ _ 
Annual 
quantity 
in acre-feet 
3,850,000 
550,000 
550,000 
112,000 
300,000 
T otal. _____ __ _____________ _______ _______________ _________ S,362,000 
A seventh priority with respect to all rcmainini,: water available ior us<! in California was appor-
tioned for ag:icultural use in the Colorado R:,·er Basin in California as shown on Map No. 23,000 of 
the Department of the In terior, Bureau of Reclamation. 
--- .. ~ -
• ' . 
TABLE 8 
I 
Estimated Future Colo:::-::10.o 7. :.vcr 1·!2.instren.7'!1 U:;e in Arizonn. 
Hoover to In-:c::-:-.ational J3oun<ln.ry 
E.st . Consu~·:ntj_ve Us e (1000 ;;f) 
Project or User Devclopncnt Year 
1980 2000 ?0)0 
Rj_r;hts nrior to C. A. P. 
1. Indian Reservations l1-35. 2 458 . 9 t,.50 . 9 
a . Colorudo Hiver (397.5) (397. 5) (397. 5) 
b . Coe op ah (1. 7) (1.7) ' (1. 7) 
c. Fort Mohave (36.0) ( 59. 7) (59 . 7) 
2. Yuma Project 220. 0 220 . 0 220 . 0 
3 . Gila Project 449.4 4l1-9. t!- 4i+9. 4 
4 . City of Yur.rn. 10.0 20 . 0 30. 0 
5. Ifa.vn.su Lake Hat. 37.3 37. 3 37. 3 
~1ildlifc Refuge 
6. Cibola National 16.8 16.8 16.8 
Wildlife Refuge 
7. Ir.tperial National 12.6 12. 6 12 .. 6 
Wildlife Refuge 
8 .. Hise . & Supplemen- 5. 0 5. 0 5. 0 
tal Claims 
Total 1,.186. 1 , 220 . 1 , 230 . 
Ilit:ilts or contracts 
.:-i ssumed eoual to C, A, P, 
1 . City of Kingman 0 1. 0 18. 5 .\ 
2. Ifavn.su Irrig. & D. D. 4. o 10 . 0 10. 0 
3. Mohave Valley L & D.D. 19 .. 0 33.0 36 . 0 
Total 23.0 44.o 6l1-. 5 
Note: Additional rennPi:;ti:; nnilPr C'nni:;idPr:irinn. 
• • t "" 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
Explanation of Sheet 1 
Tijrhts nrior to ~ . ~ . P . 
1 . IndiQn Reservations 
') 
'- . 
.... 
.) . 
~t. 
b. 
c . 
Yu.ma 
Color::i.do River 
Cocoi)ah 
Fort Viohave 
Project 1/ 
Gil<i Project 2/ 
r~st . Futur e J\crear;e - ,'.cr c::; 
1980 ?000 ;::>O~O 
99 , 375 99 , 375 99,'75 
431 1+31 r;:, l .). 
9 , 000 iti- , 916 ll:., 916 
55 , 000 55 , 000 55,000 
112 , 311-0 112 , 311-0 112 , 340 
4 . City of Yuma Dasod on present and estimated f uture population 
growth. 
5. Decreed consumptive use. 
6 . C. U. requirement as stated in Senate Ileport Ho . l1-08 , 90th 
ConGress , 1st Session , p . 49. 
7 . Decreed C. U. of 23 , 000 af/yr prorated as 12 , 600 to Arizona , 
and 10 , 400 to California. 
8. Represents C. U. for about 1 , 250 acres supportable a s havin~ 
present per fected rights . 
Otl:er Eights 
1 . Kingman Assumes nor.1inal use in 2000 and full depletion of 
r.iaximllr.1 contract diversion in 2030. Maxinun contr~ct 
diversion is 18 , 500 af/yr . 
2. Havasu I . & D. D. - Asswl1es full contract diversion by 2000 Hith 
30~,; retur!l flow. Haximum contract diversion is 
i ti- , 500 a_f/yr . 
3 . l·:ohave Valley I. &. D. D. - Assumes 30% r otu:rn flow, with full 
contract diversion in 2030 . 1970 acrear;e was 3 , i ~38 
cicres , or 13 , 750 AF C. U. (} l.i- . 0 .::.f/ac . :l.fa:d.:-:n1n 
contract diversion is 51 , 000 af/yr . 
1/ Includes 3 ,406 acres in Yuma Auxiliary Projecto 
2/ 1969 USBR Status Data. 
( 
.. , .... TABLE 9 
ARCZON{I. WA'i'ER co:.::.us~~J:Oi'T 
Sum:na:cy o~ 
Colorado Tiive:c Operation an:1 \·:n. t~:1· Supply 0tud:L•~s 
Year 
:ctem. 1930 
Glen Canyon Releases 10 ,· 221~ 
820. Net Ga:Ln, Glen Canyon to Hoover 
Lake Mead: 
Inf'lOi'r 
Evapor<:>:cion 
Spills 
Hegula.ted nelec.ses 
l'Te·i:; Losr.::es , Hoover to Mexico 
Delivery to Mexico 
Available :for u se in U.S. 
California 
neva.cla 
Arizornl 
Oth~l' than Cl1P: 
Right s p:rior to CJ\.P 
Righ·cs assumed cquaJ_ to CAP 
Centra.J. Arizona Prqjc;ct D:i..v ersion 
( 3 ,000 c:fs aqueduc·t max~) 
System losses (10~~) · · . 
.. 
SuppJ.iccl :from. Colora.clo R:i.. ver 
Supplied. :fro;n Gila Ri. ver 
Project Deliver:i..es 
11, •".:'l~L~ 
818 
505 
9,'121 
605 
l 500 
.) ,. 6 7,ol 
4, 9~5 
161 
2,910 
1 l8i-
- :> . . ,) 
:Jl~ 
:t, 670 
l67 
1,503 
50 
l 1- 5'.> 
._, -:; ·' 
Yea.:c 
2000 
9 ~ J.167 
800 
10,267 
?l>i. 
20!~ 
9, 3ii.9 
555 
l,500 
7, 29>~ 
Li. 516 > ,. 
l9o 
2,5D2 
1~220 
. 811 
l,278 
'J r 8 
.. ~ 
---
J.,150 
50 
1_, 200 
Year 
2030 
f\.verar:,f: 
1980 -2030 
·---------· 
9 ;')68 > c_ 
'i'7'7 
10,045 
?08 
122 
9, 2:L5 
555 
1,500 
7,160 
l~ > 522 
-286 
2,352 
l,230 
. gi~ 
l,038 
JO!~ 
93t~ 
. 50· 
----"~-
98'-~,..: 
56~-) 
:1._, :;oo . 
7 > JJ.8 
h_, 521~ 
2:L6 
2_, !5'(8 
J.28 
l 1 ,. ,... >. _)0 
f)O 
----=--
